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it may be felt that the testator never recognized the problem at all, in
which case the court might feel free, under the guise of construction, to
14
reach a just result.
It should not be assumed, so far as "justice" is concerned, that
an equal sharing of the gain between the widow and the other beneficiaries
would be more advantageous to the family. The widow is entitled to interest on her legacy from the time of the testator's death, and this is
a charge on the residue. 15 She is also entitled to take against her
husband's will if his scheme of disposition has actually proved injurious.
From the standpoint of passing the maximum amount of property to
the family with the smallest attrition through unnecessary estate taxation,
the testator here has probably made the wiser choice, since the substantial
gain in this case will not again be taxed at the death of the widow.
More serious, however, may be the income tax consequences. Whether
the executor sells appreciated assets to make distribution or the trustee
elects to take in kind, capital gains will have been realized at a time
when it might have been better to avoid them. Skillful management on
the part of the executor, however, including the use of the optional valuation date, can keep the loss within reasonable bounds.10
Gerald P. Lally

LABOR LAW-LABOR

MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT-COMPENSATORY

AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR BREACH OR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT.

Local 127, United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. (3d Cir. 1962).
The instant case arose out of the breach of a collective bargaining
agreement by the defendant company.' Plaintiff labor union brought suit
14. SrMs

AND

SMITH, THE LAW or FUTURS INTEREsTs,

§ 467

(1956).

15. Fiduciaries Act of 1949, § 753, PA. STAT. ANN., § 320.753 (1950).
16. Smith, Marital Deduction in Estate Planning, 32 TAxEs 15 (1954).

1. It is clear from the lower court opinion, 183 F. Supp. 568, 570 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), that the breach was the result of a deliberate scheme to gradually decrease, and ultimately to end, production at the Philadelphia plant. The secret
scheme, executed in April, 1954, was between defendant and the Carmen Shoe
Mfg. Co. of Hanover, Pa. It read as follows: "As soon as possible after May 1, 1954,
Brooks shall restrict its manufacturing activities, but shall continue the ownership
of the capital stock of Carmen." This arrangement was in violation of two
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between Brooks and plaintiff
union. Paragraph 14 of the agreement provided: "[N]o contract work shall be
given out and no contract work shall be performed in the shop or factory on shoes
known as bctter grade work . . It is agreed that the firm will continue to make
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under Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,2 alleging
violations of a contracting out provision and a guarantee against a runaway shop. The district court found that a breach had occurred and
awarded the union both compensatory and punitive damages.3 The compensatory damages were computed by projecting the foreseeable duration
of the company's relationship with the union, 4 a measure based on prin5
ciples first pronounced in the famous case of Hadley v. Baxendale. It
was decided that, had the breach not occurred, the union would have
remained the certified representative of the company's employees for a
period of at least twenty years. On this basis, the union was awarded
approximately twenty-eight thousand dollars compensatory damages, this
equalling the dues lost under the current contract plus the dues that
would have accrued to the union if the status quo had continued for the
projected twenty year period. In addition, the district court awarded
the union fifty thousand dollars in punitive damages. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, by an equally divided court,
the award of compensatory damages, but reversed, with three judges
dissenting, the district court's award of punitive damages as being beyond the scope of remedies available to the district courts under Section
301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act. Local 127, United Shoe
Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F. 2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962).
This analysis is intended to demonstrate that, while Section 301(a)
was only used as a jurisdictional device, the expanding aims of the
national labor policy require a broader, substantive interpretation, and
that all reasonable remedies devised by the courts to effectuate those
aims should be allowed under Section 301(a). It is submitted, furthermore, that judicial precedent has not dealt a death-blow to punitive damages under that section and that, in the proper circumstances, punitive
damages would seem an appropriate remedy for the courts to exercise
under Section 301(a).
The three primary considerations in determining the nature and extent of the remedies available to a district court under Section 301 must
be the language of the statute, its legislative history, and its interpretation
in the courts. Clearly, a literalist would have to read Section 301 as
the better grade shoes in their present plant [the Philadelphia plant]." Paragraph
21 of the agreement reads: "It is agreed by the Employer that the shop or factory
shall not be removed from the County of Philadelphia during the life of this
agreement."
2. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 61 Stat.
156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958), provides: "Suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without respect to the citizenship of the parties."
3. In separate proceedings, the district court found that the company breached
the agreement, as alleged by the union. Local 127, United Shoe Workers v. Brooks
Shoe Mfg. Co., 183 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Pa. 1960). The damages were awarded in a
later proceeding. 187 F. Supp. 509 (FD. Pa. 1960).
4. 187 F. Supp. at 511 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
5. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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simply granting a new, federal forum to the parties to a collective bargaining agreement in the event of a breach. The entire section,0 on its face,
is oriented toward eliminating the jurisdictional and procedural obstacles
which previously had frustrated suit in a federal court by a party to a
collective bargaining agreement. Significantly, the section does not refer
at all to substantive rights of any description. The legislative history of
Section 301 leaves little room for doubt as to the intent of the legislature; the section was understood as a jurisdictional grant, necessary
to effectuate the broad policies of the Act. It appears that the sole concern of Congress, to the extent that it is reflected in legislative history,
was to surmount the practical difficulties involved in obtaining a satisfactory forum for the settlement of disputes stemming from collective
bargaining agreements.7 Increased availability of existing remedies in
a federal court was the goal.8 The courts were split between two interpretations of Section 301 (a) for nearly a decade. One view construed
the section as merely giving federal district courts jurisdiction in controversies that involved labor organizations in industries affecting commerce, without regard to diversity of citizenship or the amount in controversy. 9 Those holding the other view understood Section 301(a) as authorizing the federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.1 0 It was not until 1957, in
the much-noted Lincoln Mills decision, 1 that the Supreme Court resolved this conflict over the meaning of Section 301 in favor of the
broader view and laid the foundation for a new body of federally created
substantive law. From this decision, it appears that the legal significance
6. The other subsections of Section 301 are exclusively concerned with juris-

dictional and procedural matters. Subsection (b) treats of responsibility for acts
of an agent, entity for purposes of suit, and enforcement of money judgments;
subsection (c) deals directly with the subjects of the district courts' jurisdiction;
subsection (d) provides for service of process; and subsection (e) lays down
exceptions to the usual rules for determining questions of agency.
7. 93 Cong. Rec. 4141 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft). On April 28, 1947
Senator Taft raised this rhetorical question before the Senate:- "What is the
purpose of Title 3 [Section 301] ?" In answer to his own question, he went on,
"The purpose of Title 3 is to give the employer and the employee the right to go to
the federal courts to bring a suit to enforce the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement."
8. S. Min. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947). The Senate minority
report contains the following statement: "This section [301] does not, therefore,
create a new cause of action but merely makes the existing remedy available to
more persons by removing the requirements -of amount in controversy and of
diversity of citizenship where interstate commerce is affected." (The Senate minority
was in agreement with the majority as to this particular section.)
9. United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F2d 323 (7th Cir.
1957); Intl. Ladies Garment Workers v. Jay-Ann Co., 228 F.2d 632 (5th Cir.
1956) (semble); Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers, 187 F.2d 980 (10th
Cir. 1951).
10. Signal-Stat. Corp. v. Local 475, U.E.W. 235 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1956);
Rock Drilling Union v. Mason and Hanger Co., 217 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1954);
Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F.2d
623 (3d Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 437, 75 S. Ct. 489 (1955);
Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 F.2d 158
(9th Cir. 1950).
11. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S. Ct. 912 (1957).
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of collective bargaining agreements had assumed new proportions in the
eyes of the Court. In holding that federal substantive law must be applied in cases arising under Section 301, and that the federal courts must
fashion this law according to the dictates of national labor policy, 12 the
Court was, in effect, recognizing the need for better-adapted law and
remedies to replace the archaic contrivances of an age gone by. In
dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter revealed the fruitless void which exists
in the legislative history of Section 301 as far as evidence to support
the Lincoln Mills interpretation is concerned.' 3 This view, however, fails
to take account of the fact that the proper interpretation to be given a
particular section is very often best determined by the policy behind the
Act as a whole. Judge Wyzanski persuasively advocated a broad interpretation of Section 301 in these words:
The legislative purpose in enacting §301 was obviously to prescribe
an "effective method of assuring freedom from economic warfare
for the term of the agreement" and "to encourage the making of
agreements and to promote industrial peace through faithful performance of the parties
of collective agreements . .. enforceable in
14
the federal courts.'
Implicit in this position is a belief that the over-all purpose of the Act
so permeates its every part as to control the interpretation of a given
part when a close case arises. It is from such a viewpoint that the limitations of language and particular legislative history can be surmounted and
the Lincoln Mills decision seen in the favorable light of conformity with
legislative purpose.
Given then that Lincoln Mills did authorize the creation of a new
body of federal law, can the remedies administered under Section 301 (a)
be extended beyond the ordinary devices, such as compensatory damages,
injunction,' 5 and specific enforcement of arbitration agreements? 16 Con12. Id., 353 U.S. at 456, 457, 77 S. Ct. at 918: "We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must

fashion from the policy of our national labor laws .... Other problems will lie in
the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory
sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning
a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will
be determined by the nature of the problem. (Emphasis supplied).
13. See the exhaustive appendix to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent, 353 U.S. at

485-546, 77 S. Ct. at 936-963 (1957).

In delivering the majority opinion, Mr.

Justice Douglas admitted that the legislative history of Section 301 is somewhat
cloudy and confusing. He then went on to point out a few "shafts of light" that
illuminate the problem, but they do not seem capable in the least of overcoming the
ocean of conflicting legislative history which Mr. Justice Frankfurter cited.
14. Textile Workers v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass.
1953).

15. Farrand Optical Co. v.Local 475, Intl. Union of Electrical Workers, 143

F. Supp. 527 (S.D. N.Y. 1956). This case points up some of the interesting prob-

lems resulting from an apparent overlapping of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat.
70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958) and the Labor Management Relations Act, 61
Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
16. Within the federal law to be fashioned by the federal courts under the

Lincoln Mills case is included specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances
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sistent reasoning suggests that the Lincoln Mills decision, by giving effect
to the broad dictates of our national labor policy in the particular instance
of Section 301, at the same time made available all reasonable remedies
known or to be devised, 11 provided only that they operate to advance the
same broad aims. Apparently, it was in this light that the district court
approached the instant case and decided to award unusual compensatory
damages and punitive damages to the injured union. The appellate court
questioned that decision in two respects: (1) the measure applied in determining the amount of compensatory damages due the union; (2) the
the correctness of allowing any punitive damages whatsoever. The former
would seem to present the simpler problem. To measure the extent of the
injury done to a union by calculating the amount of dues lost is not a
practice unknown to the federal courts.' s The error in the instant case, if
any, lies in the extension of the loss period beyond the term of the par-

ticular contract breached. When the loss was projected for a substantial
period into the future, the measure allegedly became unfit because of its
speculativeness. This, however, ignores the fact that all awards of consequential damages, awarded under the well-established rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale,19 must of their nature involve a greater or lesser degree of
speculation. Indeed, in the instant case the district court appears to have
done everything possible to minimize the margin of guesswork by limiting
the projected damage period to twenty years, by basing the assessment
on the status quo without allowance for reasonable increases, and by
inquiring very deeply into the past and present financial stability of the
company. 20 Furthermore, even if the compensatory damages were not
computed at the minimum point of foreseeability, certainly the award was
not clearly erroneous. 2' No sound argument has been advanced, nor does
it seem that one could be contrived, for requiring that a lesser degree of
foreseeability be used in determining the damages for breach of a collective
under collective bargaining agreements. See Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 YAL, L.J. 167 (1956-57).
17. Mr. Justice Douglas suggests this in saying, 353 U.S. at 448, 77 S. Ct.
at 918 (1957) : "[W]e see no justification in policy for restricting § 301 (a) to damage

suits, leaving specific performance of a contract to arbitrate grievance disputes to
the inapposite procedural requirements of that Act [The Norris-LaGuardia Act]."
Granted that Justice Douglas' words must be limited by their context, it still seems
that he was opposed to a restrictive interpretation of Section 301 (a) in a broader
sense.

18. Burlesque Artist's Assn. v. Hirst Enterprises, Inc., 267 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.
1959).

19. 9 Ex. 341, 354, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854): " . . such as may fairly and
reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of
things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed
to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the
contract, as the probable result of the breach of it."

20. The court considered the following facts in its determination: that the
same family had controlled the company for forty years; that the union had represented the employees at the Philadelphia plant since it was first organized in
1937; that the present owner had shown a persistent interest in the continuation of
the operation; and, that there was no present prospect of liquidation, but, on the
contrary, evidence of vigorous growth.
21. See FxD. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
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bargaining agreement than that employed in ordinary breach of contract
actions. The only argument against the measure used in the instant case
that displays any degree of plausibility was introduced by Judge Kalodner
in his dissent, which maintained that the majority had overlooked the
fact that, upon expiration of the present agreement, the company would
22
have been free to move away for a "number of legitimate business reasons.
This, however, appears to confuse possibility with probability or foresee23
ability, when the latter notion is the keyword to consequential damages.
Under all the circumstances, it is probable or foreseeable that the company
would not remove its operations from Philadelphia, if only for fear that
it would constitute an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (5)24 of
the National Labor Relations Act. Thus it would be subject to either an
injunction or an order from the Board that the operations be moved back,
for if such a move is motivated not by economic reasons but rather by
anti-union animus or an intent to avoid legal responsibilities, it is a
violation of the law. 25 Valid economic reasons for a move in the instant
case simply did not exist. At best, it was a remote possibility, in view of

the financial state of the business, that legitimate economic reasons would
develop within twenty years whereby injury to the union would be merely
an unavoidable incidental.
A wholly new concept in the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements under Section 301 is presented by the district court's action in
awarding punitive damages. The cornerstone of the argument against
such an award is the Supreme Court's decision in Republic Steel Corp v.
NLRB. 28 It is submitted that that case does not contain the holding that
has been attributed to it by the court in the instant case. There the situation
was unique; the damages awarded were not punitive in the ordinary sense
of the word, rather, they were more akin to criminal penalties or fines
in that they did not proceed directly to the injured party, the employees,
but instead to the government. Further, the damages were not awarded to
effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act but rather to
22. 298 F.2d 277 (1962).
23. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 354, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
24. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, § 8(a) (5), 49 Stat. 453, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (5) (1958). "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . .to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ......
25. Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954). Even
where an employer has valid economic reasons for moving, he still must confront
the union with his plans so that the union can consider representation of the employees in the new shop. Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999
(1953).
26. 311 U.S. 7, 61 S. Ct. 77 (1940). Having found that the company had
engaged in unfair labor practices by reason of its domination of the union, the
Board did more than order the company to cease and desist from these practices, to
withdraw recognition from the union, and to reinstate those employees discriminatorily discharged with back pay. In providing for back pay, the Board directed the
company to deduct from the payments to the reinstated employees the amounts they
had received for work performed upon "work relief projects", and to pay over such
amounts to the appropriate governmental agencies. This latter aspect of the Board's
order is the punitive measure referred to here. But see, Virginia Electric and Power
Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 63 S.Ct. 1214 (1943).
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preserve the integrity of the Works Project Administration. In this very
unusual situation, the Court expressed some very broad views with respect
to the extent of the Board's authority under its mandate to effectuate the
policies of the Act,2 7 labelling its function as being purely remedial and
not punitive. In a recent case,2 wherein the union was ordered to reinburse its members for dues paid, the union was found to have committed
an unfair labor practice by enforcing an agreement which established
closed-shop preferential hiring conditions. As a result, two applicants
were refused work by the employer. In this context the Court reiterated
the same broad statements it had made in Republic Steel Corp., as to the nonpunitive, remedial nature of the Board's function. Here again, though, there
is no clear language relating directly to punitive damages. The Court
merely condemned an attempt by the Board to impose a penalty-like
burden on the union where it was clear that the union had not been unlawfully created and the employees had not been coerced to join the
union or to remain members. Support is lent to the view that advocates
a broad interpretation of the Board's powers by Justice Whittaker's
dissent in that case which urges that the remedy invoked by the Board
was within its power under the clause "necessary . . . to effectuate the

policies of the Act."'29 All that seems to be required of the Board by the
Act is that it "fashion and enforce a remedy which it deems adequate
to that end." s While the Court may have been justified in striking down
an action of the Board that was not purely remedial, it does not necessarily
follow that Justice Whittaker's approach would not have a more persuasive influence in a case where the facts presented a need for stronger
measures by the Board.
The more reasonable approach to the award of punitive damages in
cases such as the instant case would seem to be by way of the traditional
inquiry into whether such damages are appropriate where the cause of
action arises from a breach of contract and not from a tort. 1 Admittedly,
it has only been in a few instances that the actual breach itself has
been deemed so inexcusable as to be deserving of punishment as a wanton
or wilful tort. 2 But it seems that many of the isolated cases where punitive damages have been allowed in connection with a breach of contract possessed qualities that are found compounded in the instant case. The
27. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235, 236, 59 S. Ct.
206, 219 (1938); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 267, 268,
58 S.Ct. 571, 574, 575 (1938).
28. Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 81 S. Ct.
875 (1961).
29. 365 U.S. 651,662, 81 S. Ct. 875, 881 (1961).
30. Ibid.
31. See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 1077 (1951) ; McCORMIcK, DAMAGES § 81 (1935);
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 1340 (rev'd ed. 1937); RXSTATEMZNT, CONTRACTS § 342
(1932).
32. Hood v. Moffett, 109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664 (1915) (physician's refusal to
attend woman at childbirth); Addis v. Gramophone Co., Ltd., [1909] A.C. 488,
(abrupt dismissal of employee without cause and before expiration of employment
contract).
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element of fraud (evidenced here by the secret agreement wherein the
subsequent breach was planned) has given rise to punitive damages in
some contract situations.3 8 Breach of a public duty, imposed by law,
occasioned an imposition of punitive damages in several instances, especially
in cases involving public utilities.4 Thus there does exist an exceptional
area where a breach of contract may support an award of punitive damages,
that is, "where a breach of contract merges with and assumes the character
of a wilful tort, calculated rather than inadvertant, flagrant, and in disregard of obligations of trust."35 It is submitted that conduct which would
amount to an unfair labor practice under the Act in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement should fall into this classification, as being,
if not a tort, at least tantamount to a tort. In the absence of precedent, it
is especially important to scrutinize the behavior in question before concluding that it is gravely tortious in nature. The company's conduct in the
instant case amounted to this: pursuant to a preconceived scheme, 36 the
company did an act (decreased production, finally moving away in avoidance of its contract) which it knew or should have known would virtually
certainly result in a substantial pecuniary loss to an innocent party, the
union. Bearing this conduct in mind, it is well to consider the traditional
aims warranting an award of punitive damages, in relation to the case at
hand. Such an award would bring to punishment oppressive conduct,
contrary to public policy, which otherwise would go unpunished. The deterrent value of Section 301, in its application to such conduct, would
be greatly increased. Further, the injured party would be provided with
an additional incentive to prosecute his claims; the financial burden faced
by impecunious parties to a collective bargaining agreement in bringing
suit would be defrayed or eliminated. Thus, while a wilful breach of a collective bargaining agreement may not constitute conduct heretofore considered gravely tortious, it seems both reasonable and proper to treat it
as such for the purpose of awarding punitive damages, especially if it is
clear that the same conduct would constitute an unfair labor practice under
the Act, had the contract been absent. If the practice of arbitrarily breaching collective bargaining agreements is even tacitly condoned by judicial
inaction, a pillar of our national labor policy will have been undermined.
Thomas F. Caffrey
33. Brown v.Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Hobbes v.Smith, 27 Okla.

830, 115 Pac.347 (1911).
34. Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701, 147 S.W. 411 (1912);
Carmichael v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel.- Co., 157 N.C. 21, 72 S.E. 619 (1911);
Williams v. Carolina and N.W. R. Co., 144 N.C. 498, 57 S.E. 216 (1907); Ft.
Smith and W. R. Co. v. Ford, 34 OkLa. 575, 126 Pac. 745 (1912); Pittsburgh,
C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Lyon, 123 Pa. 140, 16 At. 607 (1889).

35. Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
36. See note 1 supra.
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